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The Due Process Clause Does Not Prohibit the
Mandatory Detention of a Criminal Resident Alien
Pending Deportation and Removal Proceedings:
Demore v. Hyung Joon Kim
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - FIFTH AMENDMENT - DUE PROCESS -
PRE-DEPORTATION DETAINMENT - The Supreme Court of the
United States held that a statute mandating the detention of a
criminal alien while awaiting a deportation hearing is not a viola-
tion of the resident alien's Fifth Amendment right of Due Process.
Demore v. Hyung Joon Kim, 123 S. Ct. 1708 (2003).
The United States Code states that the Attorney General shall
detain any alien who is potentially deportable because that alien
has committed either a dangerous felony or a crime involving
moral turpitude.' Hyung Joon Kim (hereinafter "Kim") moved into
the United States in 1984 when he was six years old; two years
later he became a lawfully admitted permanent resident alien.2 In
July of 1996, Kim was convicted of first-degree burglary.3 He was
convicted of a second crime in April of 1997. Due to these convic-
tions, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) charged
Kim with being deportable; as such, Kim was detained pending
his deportation hearing.5 During his detainment, Kim did not re-
ceive a bond hearing and thus no determination was made in re-
gard to whether Kim posed a danger to society or a risk of flight.6
1. Demore v. Hyung Joon Kim, 123 S. Ct. 1708, 1712 (2003) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)
(2000)). The types of offenses may fall into one of two potential categories: (1) an 'aggra-
vated felony" or (2) "crimes of moral turpitude". 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii) (2000). See
also 8 U.S.C. § 237(a)(2)(A) (ii)-(iii) (2000).
2. Kim, 123 S. Ct. at 1712. Lawfully admitted permanent resident aliens are given
the opportunity to establish a permanent life in the United States by developing economic,
social, and family ties indistinguishable from those of a United States citizen. Id. at 1728.
They are taxed the same and are virtually identical to citizens apart from voting rights,
jury duty and certain forms of public assistance. Id. at 1728-29.
3. Id.
4. Id. Kim's second conviction was for "petty theft with priors." Because the validity
of these convictions was not contested, the surrounding facts of those crimes were inconse-
quential to the issue. Id.
5. Id. Such a detention is mandatory when an alien has been convicted of any two
"crimes involving moral turpitude..." 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226(c)(1)(B), 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii).
6. Kim, 123 S. Ct. at 1713.
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While awaiting the deportation hearing, Kim was held in custody
for three months and the hearing was scheduled to take place two
months later.7
After three months, Kim filed a writ of habeas corpus' challeng-
ing the constitutionality of his detention by alleging a violation of
his due process rights.9 The United States District Court for the
Northern District of California applied the Salerno test in deter-
mining whether Kim's constitutional right to due process, as a
permanent resident alien, had been violated.10 The district court
broke the test into two prongs, the first being whether 8 U.S.C. §
1226(c)" itself was permissible, and the latter prong being
whether 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)'s enforcement would be "excessive in
light of its goals". 2
In determining that Kim's dilemma involved substantive due
process, 3 the district court discussed Congress's plenary power
over immigration policies. 4 In conjunction with this power, the
court reasoned that Congress intended to prevent criminal behav-
ior of aliens and to decrease the number of aliens who did not re-
turn for their deportation proceedings." Therefore, the first prong
of the test was then satisfied since Congress had the power to leg-
islate on the issue in order to protect the public interest. 6
7. Id. at 1721 n.15.
8. Habeas Corpus is "A writ employed to bring a person before the court, most fre-
quently to ensure that the party's imprisonment or detention was not illegal ... may be
used to obtain review of... the right to or amount of bail". BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 715
(7th ed. 1999).
9. Kim v. Schiltgen, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12511, *1-2 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
10. Id. at *1, *4-5. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987). "It is well estab-
lished that the Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of the law in deportation
proceedings." Kim, 123 S. Ct. at 1717 (quoting Reno v. Flores 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993)).
11. The United States District Court for the Northern District of California referred to
8 CFR § 236.1(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act rather then referring to 8 U.S.C. §
1226(c). Neither the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals nor the United States Supreme Court
mentioned the discrepancy. This is because 8 CFR § 236.1 has been codified in the United
States Code under 8 U.S.C. § 1226.
12. Kim, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12511 at *1.
13. Substantive due process violations occur whenever the government interferes with
rights that are "implicit in the concept of liberty." Id. at *10 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1937)). "It is clear that lawful resident aliens possess substantive
due process rights during deportation proceedings." Id. at *12 (citing Landon v. Plascen-
cia, 459 U.S. 21, 33 (1982)).
14. Id. at *14. So long as the exercise of plenary authority does not offend a constitu-
tional restriction, Congress shall have plenary authority over all substantive legislation.
Id. (citing I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 940-41 (1983)).
15. Id. at *20. Twenty percent of criminal aliens released on bond did not return for
their removal proceedings. Id.
16. Id.
Demore v. Hyung Joon Kim
The district court concluded that the mandatory detention, cre-
ated in 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), makes an irrebuttable presumption
that every criminal alien poses either a flight risk or a danger to
society. 17 Arguing by analogy, the court showed that the Supreme
Court previously allowed the detention of communist aliens, but
stated that the injury could not automatically be imputed gener-
ally to all aliens. 8 The district court then concluded that the sec-
ond prong has not been meet because of the unfair nature of the
presumption, which is based on a small minority of criminal
aliens.'9 The district court held that statute used excessive means
to accomplish its goal and was therefore unconstitutional on its
face.2"
Following the district court's ruling, the INS then gave Kim an
individual bond hearing, in lieu of which the INS released Kim on
$5,000 bond.2' The INS appealed the district court's ruling to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.2  The circuit
court rejected the district court's finding that 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)
was unconstitutional on its face based on the Salerno test.23 The
appellate court held that the statute not only applied to perma-
nent resident aliens, but it also applied to aliens who have not en-
tered the country.24 This distinction branches to the next step of
the court's reasoning, which further distinguished permanent
resident aliens from other categories of aliens.25 The court then
reaffirmed the well-established rule that aliens have due process
rights under the Fifth Amendment.2' Based on these distinctions
17. Id. at *21.
18. Kim, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12511 at *21 (citing Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 538
(1952)). The defendants in Carlson were charged with being members of the Communist
Party and they were held without bond pending determination of deportability. Carlson,
342 U.S. at 526. The Supreme Court held that because the defendants were menaces to
society, their detention was constitutional. Id. at 541.
19. Kim, U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12511 at *21-22.
20. Id. at *29.
21. Kim v. Ziglar, 276 F. 3d 523, 526 (9th Cir. 2002). James Ziglar was substituted for
his predecessor Thomas Schiltgen as Commissioner. Id. at 523.
22. Id. Although Kim was longer in the custody of the INS, a controversy remained
because the INS would take Kim back into custody and hold him without bail if the Ninth
Circuit Court would reverse the Northern District of California's holding. Id.
23. Id. at 527.
24. Id. at 527-28 (citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 692 (2001)).
25. Id. at 528. Other categories of aliens may include those who entered illegally, those
with a temporary status and those who attempted to enter illegally but where detained at
the border. Id.
26. Kim, 276 F. 3d at 530 (citing Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 692). "No person shall... be




and rules, the appellate court affirmed the district court's ruling
in part, by holding that 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) was not unconstitu-
tional on its face, but rather it is only unconstitutional when ap-
plied to lawfully admitted permanent resident aliens.27
The appellate court upheld the government's two justifications
for the mandatory detentions, which were presence of the criminal
aliens at the deportation hearing, and protection of society from
the dangerous risks such aliens may pose. 28 The end result estab-
lished that criminal aliens, with permanent resident status, may
be detained while awaiting a deportation hearing, but unlike other
aliens with a subordinate status, shall be granted a bail hearing in
order to protect their due process rights.29
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari3 in
order to resolve the constitutionality of the statute, which creates
a mandatory detention of criminal aliens, who are waiting for a
deportation trial without allowing the opportunity of an individu-
alized bond or bail hearing.3
Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion of the
Court.32 Part I of the opinion addressed the issue of whether §
1226(e) deprives the federal courts of jurisdiction to grant the ha-
beas relief sought.33 The issue was raised pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §
1226(e) which states:
The Attorney General's discretionary judgment regarding the
application of this section shall not be subject to review. No
court may set aside any action or decision by the Attorney
General under this section regarding the detention or release
27. Id. at 539.
28. Demore v. Kim, 123 S. Ct. 1708, at 1713. Demore is District Director of the San
Francisco District of Immigration and Naturalization Service, or INS. Id. at 1708.
29. Id.
30. Certiorari is "[a]n extraordinary writ issued by an appellate court to an inferior
court, at its discretion, directing a lower court to deliver the record in the case for review.
The U.S. Supreme Court uses certiorari to review most of the cases it decides to hear."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 220 (7th ed. 1999).
31. Kim, 123 S. Ct. at 1713-14. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).
32. Kim, S. Ct. at 1712. The majority included Justice Kennedy in full and Justices
Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer joined in part I. Justices O'Connor, Scalia and Tho-
mas joined in all but part I. Id. at 1711.
33. Id. at 1713. This Jurisdictional question had not been raised by the lower courts;
moreover the question of whether the U.S. Supreme Court has jurisdiction to consider the
issues on appeal was not raised by either party's brief; but it was first raised by an amicus
curiae brief submitted by The Washington Legal Foundation. Kim, 123 S. Ct at 1714.
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of any alien of the grant, revocation, or denial of bond or pa-
rol.'
The Court grounded its analysis with the well-recognized rule
that when the Congressional intent is to preclude judicial review
of constitutional claims, such intent must be clear.35 Chief Justice
Rehnquist ruled that the issue presented before the Court was not
a review of the Attorney General's "discretionary judgment," but
rather a review of the "statutory framework that permits his
[Kim's] detention without bail."36 Also, because Congress did not
specifically state that habeas petitions were not subject to review,
the Court found that it had jurisdiction over this particular
claim.3"
In part II, Court undertook its analysis to determine the consti-
tutionality of mandatory detentions of criminal aliens, who are
subject to deportation." The Court began the analysis by stating,
"[i]n the exercise of its broad power over naturalization and immi-
gration, Congress regularly makes rules that would be unaccept-
able if applied to citizens."39 However, it is a well-established rule
that aliens are protected by the Fifth Amendment right of due
process in regard to deportation proceedings." The issue was
therefore whether the due process clause bars detainment of resi-
dent aliens without an individualized judicial determination that
the detained aliens were unlikely to appear for later deportation
proceedings.4 '
Kim was not challenging Congress' authority to deport him, nor
was he contesting that he was deportable within the meaning of 8
U.S.C. § 1226(c). 2 Rather Kim was arguing against the irrebut-
table presumption that all aliens raise such a high risk of flight
and danger that it mandated his individual detention.43 Kim's ar-
gument rested heavily upon the United States Supreme Court
34. Id. at 1713-14 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) (2000)).
35. Id. at 1714 (citing Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 599-600 (1988)).
36. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e)).
37. Kim, 123 S. Ct. at 1714.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1716-17 (quoting Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1976)). The rights and
liberties of aliens are subject to limitations and conditions not applicable to citizens. Kim,
123 S. Ct. at 1716 (citing Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 305-06 (1993)).
40. Id. at 1717 (citing Flores, 507 U.S. at 306).
41. Kim, 123 S. Ct. at 1718. See also Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952).
42. Kim, 123 S. Ct. at 1716. See also 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).
43. Kim, 123 S. Ct. at 1718.
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case of Zadvydas v. Davis." Chief Justice Rehnquist distin-
guished Zadvydas, because it referred to the detention period after
a deportation hearing, while the alien awaits actual removal.45
The Chief Justice concluded the Court's opinion by stating,
"[d]etention during removal proceedings is a constitutionally per-
missible part of that process."6 Studies have shown that deport-
able criminal aliens, who were released, would frequently engage
in further criminal behavior.47 Moreover, there is evidence sug-
gesting that allowing the discretionary release of aliens pending
their hearings would lead to large numbers of deportable criminal
aliens skipping their hearings and remaining at large.48  These
possible risks outweigh the limited period of detention an alien
may incur while awaiting a deportation hearing.4 9
Justice O'Connor concurred in the judgment and joined in the
majority opinion as to all but part 1.50 Justice O'Connor agreed
with the majority's analysis and ultimate ruling on the merits of
Kim's claim, but did not agree with Chief Justice Rehnquist in the
determination that the Court had the jurisdictional authority to
hear the case.5 Justice O'Connor argued that 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e)
established Congress' clear intent to prohibit federal courts from
"setting aside" the decision to detain a criminal alien during the
duration of the removal proceedings.52 Justice O'Connor believed
that Chief Justice Rehnquist was mistaken in determining that
44. Id at 1719-20. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), which provides that a
continued detention of an alien can be secured for only such time as is reasonably necessary
to secure that alien's removal.
45. Kim, 123 S. Ct. at 1719-20. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231 (2000), which provides that when
an alien has been ordered removed; he may be detained at the discretion of the Attorney
General until such removal can be made. Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist separates the cases
further, by adding that detentions following the removal hearings are potentially indefinite
and permanent, but the detention periods preceding the hearings can only last until those
hearings take place. Kim, 123 S. Ct. at 1720-21. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 691.
46. Kim, 123 S. Ct. at 1721-22.
47. Id. at 1714-15. 77% were arrested at least once, while 45% were arrested multiple
times. See Hearing on H. R. 3333 before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and
International Law of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 54, 52
(1989)). In response to the respondent's argument that these statistics are irrelevant to
showing that individualized bond hearings are "ineffective and burdensome," the Court
declared that when the government action with respect to deportable aliens is reviewed
under the Due Process Clause, the government is not required to employ the least burden-
some means to accomplish its goals. Kim, 123 S. Ct. 1720.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1722.
50. Id. at 1722-23 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas joined.
Id.
51. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
52. Kim, 123 S. Ct. at 1723 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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the clause did not specifically bar habeas claims from judicial re-
view.53 Justice O'Connor's opinion argued that if Congress in-
tended for judicial considerations of habeas review, the language
of the statute would not read as "[n]o court may set aside any ac-
tion .... "5
The concurring opinion discussed whether a denial of habeas re-
lief is constitutional under the Suspension Clause.55 Justice
O'Connor opined that the constitutionality of the limitations on
habeas review turns on whether the writ was available to those in
Kim's position in 1789.56 The historical evidence showed that Kim
would not have been able to challenge his limited detention until
very recently.57 Justice O'Connor concluded her concurrence by
stating that there was no need to determine whether § 1226(e)
violates the Suspension Clause, as the majority opinion held that
the Court does have jurisdiction; for the purpose presented, it was
enough for the argument to state that § 1226(e) denies the Court
jurisdiction.58
Justice Kennedy, who joined in all parts of the majority opinion,
also wrote a separate concurring opinion.59 Justice Kennedy's con-
currence added a consideration that was not previously ad-
dressed. ° Justice Kennedy noted that the Due Process Clause
prohibits arbitrary deprivations of liberty, and as such, permanent
resident aliens who are unreasonably or unjustifiably detained
must have their opportunity for an individual hearing for due
process requirements to be satisfied." Justice Kennedy found that
such an opportunity was available to the defendant in this case, as
the defendant was entitled to a hearing during which he could
have demonstrated that he did not fall within one of the manda-
tory detention categories." Justice Kennedy concludes that Kim's
53. Id. at 1724 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
54. Id. at 1723 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e).
55. Kim, 123 S. Ct. at 1725 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The Suspension Clause states,
"t]he Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases
of Rebellion of Invasion the public Safety may require it." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
56. Kim, 123 S. Ct. at 1725 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The Suspension Clause was
adopted, along with the Constitution, in 1789. Id.
57. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). See Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952), for the
first instance of a habeas review of this nature.
58. Kim, 123 S. Ct. at 1726 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
59. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
60. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
61. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. at 718-19 (Ken-
nedy, J., dissenting)).
62. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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situation was not too unreasonable when weighing the time period
of his detention and the potential threats he posed as a criminal
alien.63
Justice Souter authored a dissenting opinion.6' Justice Souter
began his dissent by agreeing with the majority opinion in the
first part of its analysis, namely that the court held jurisdictional
authority over the issues presented before the Court.65 The dis-
sent continued by remarking that Kim did not concede that he was
deportable, but rather he intended to deny that the crimes he
committed fell within the categories of either "aggravated felonies"
or "crimes of moral turpitude."6 Justice Souter believed the ma-
jority emphasized that Kim did concede his deportability, thereby
rendering the deportation hearing not as substantial as Kim him-
self would hold it.
67
The second phase of the dissent focused specifically on the dis-
tinguishing characteristics of permanent resident aliens.6" Justice
Souter argued that lawfully admitted permanent resident aliens
share such a similarity with actual citizens that they can live
permanently in the United States virtually indistinguishable from
citizens.69 "The law therefore considers a [lawfully admitted per-
manent resident] to be at home in the United States, and even
when the Government seeks removal, we have accorded [them]
greater protections then other aliens under the Due Process
Clause."70 Justice Souter stated that liberty is norm in the United
States, and detention preceding a trial is the limited exception.7'
As such, Justice Souter contended that the heightened standard of
the Due Process Clause would therefore require a compelling rea-
son for a pre-trial type detention. 2 Relying on Zadvydas, Justice
Souter argued that only special justifications could outweigh an
63. Kim, 123 S. Ct. at 1726 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
64. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting). Justices Breyer, Stevens, and Ginsburg join, concurring
in part and dissenting in part. Id.
65. Id. at 1727 (Souter, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 1727-28 (Souter, J., dissenting). See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c).
67. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
68. Kim, 123 S. Ct. at 1728-29 (Souter, J., dissenting).
69. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting). Lawfully admitted permanent residents (LPRs) share
the same economic benefits as citizens and they typically share close family and relation-
ship ties to citizens. Id. (Souter, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 1730 (Souter, J., dissenting). See Landon v. Plascencia, 459 U.S. 21 (1982).
71. Kim, 123 S. Ct. at 1731 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Salerno, 481
U.S. 739, 747-48 (1987)).
72. Id. at 1732 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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alien's powerful interest in avoiding physical confinement.73 The
Court in Zadvydas held that aliens who had already been estab-
lished as a risk to society were entitled to due process rights with
regard to their post-trial detention; as such, Justice Souter con-
tends that Kim should be entitled to the same protections from
unjust detention since he was not even legally established as a
risk. 4 Justice Souter urged that the majority had failed to distin-
guish the Zadvydas rationale from Kim's situation. 5 The dissent
believed that the judgment of the United States Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit should be affirmed, thereby requir-
ing a bail hearing to determine whether Kim posed a risk or dan-
ger.7
6
Justice Souter next discussed the Carlson case that Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist had cited in the majority opinion." Justice Souter
contended that each of the respondent aliens in Carlson had been
found to be a danger to the public interest; that is not the case in
Kim's dilemma, as he has not been deemed a danger."8
Justice Souter concluded that the issues presented by Kim are
not about the congressional authority to justifiably detain criminal
aliens; rather, they are about the blanket presumption that re-
quires potentially non-dangerous resident aliens to be detained
without justification. 9 Justice Souter concluded that bail hearings
should have been granted to determine whether Kim exhibited the
propensities of a dangerous criminal alien.0
Justice Breyer wrote the final opinion. s' First, Justice Breyer
concurred with the jurisdictional argument presented by the ma-
73. Id. at 1734, 1736 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678,
690 (2000)). The majority opinion specifically addressed Zadvydas and distinguished it as
dealing with post-trail detentions rather then pre-trial detentions. Kim, 123 S. Ct. at 1719-
21.
74. Id. at 1738 (Souter, J., dissenting). See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 692.
75. Kim, 123 S. Ct. at 1742 (Souter, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 1736 (Souter, J., dissenting). See Kim v. Ziglar, 276 F. 3d 523, (9th Cir.
2002).
77. Kim, 123 S. Ct. at 1742 (Souter, J., dissenting). See Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S.
524 (1952).
78. Kim, 123 S. Ct. at 1743 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Carlson, 342 U.S. at 541-42).
The majority opinion refers to Justice Souter's contention as "mistaken" by stating that
there was not an "individualized finding" of dangerous propensities as to any of the alien
respondents in Carlson. Kim, 123 S. Ct. at 1718. The detention in Carlson was a part of
the procedures for deportation; it did not stand for the proposition that detentions are a
necessary part of every deportation, nor did it state that such detentions should not be
subject to bail hearings. Id. at 1745. (Souter, J., dissenting). See Carlson, 342 U.S. at 526.
79. Kim, 123 S. Ct. at 1746 (Souter, J., dissenting).
80. Id. at 1746 (Souter, J., dissenting).
81. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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jority opinion.82 Second, Justice Breyer dissented with the conten-
tion that Kim had voluntarily conceded that he was deportable.
8 3
Third, Justice Breyer dissented with the majority's conclusion."
Federal law makes bail available to convicted criminals only if "(1)
the appeal is 'not for the purpose of delay,' (2) the appeal 'raises a
substantial question of law or fact' and (3) the defendant shows by
'clear and convincing evidence' that, if released, he 'is not likely to
flee or pose a danger to the safety' of the community."85 The stat-
ute at issue is silent as to whether these standards should be ap-
plied in deportation proceedings.86 Justice Breyer then interpreted
the statute to include the standards since it did not explicitly ex-
clude them." Justice Breyer then advocated remanding the case
to the Ninth Circuit to determine whether Kim satisfied the three
requirements for bail.8"
On April 24, 1996, Congress passed the Antiterrorism and Ef-
fective Death Penalty Act of 1996, which established inter alia,
mandatory detention for criminal aliens without a bond hearing. 9
Several months later, on September 30, 1996, Congress passed the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996.90 This Act specifically amended 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) to include
mandatory pre-deportation detention of criminal aliens.91 The
mandatory detention applied only to aliens who have been con-
victed of crimes falling into the categories of either "an aggravated
felony" or "crimes of moral turpitude".92
82. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See Id at 1713-14.
83. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Kim made no statements
suggesting a concession to the proposition that the crimes, of which he was convicted,
where those of "aggravated felonies" or "crimes of moral turpitude". Kim, 123 S. Ct. at
1746-47 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (c); See
also 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii)-(iii).
84. Kim, 123 S. Ct. at 1747 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
85. Id. at 1747 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing 18 U.S.C. §
3143(b) (2000)).
86. Kim, 123 S. Ct. at 1747 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
87. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
88. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
89. Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Man-
datory Predeportation Detention Provision of Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. §
1226(c)) As Amended, 187 A.L.R. Fed. 325, 334 (2003).
90. Id. See also Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 698 (2001).
91. Id. Before the amendment, 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (c) provided that the Attorney General
shall deport the alien as expeditiously as possible ... and [did] not require that an alien
must be detained by the INS". Id. at 335.
92. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i),(iii).)) Aggravated Felony is
defined as (A) murder, rape, sexual abuse of minor; (B) trafficking controlled substances;
(C) trafficking firearms or explosive devices . . .(F) crime of violence with a jail sentence
exceeding one year; (G) theft offense with a jail sentence exceeding one year; offenses re-
Vol. 42364
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The Supreme Court of the United States first encountered the
issue of pre-deportation detentions in Carlson v. Landon, decided
in 1952.93 The primary issue in Carlson was whether the Attorney
General, after taking into custody active alien communists on
warrants, may continue to hold them in custody without bail, at
his discretion, pending determination of the alien's deportability.94
The Court relied upon the relevant statutes at the time, which
stated that "any alien who shall have entered or who shall be
found in the United States in violation of this chapter, or in viola-
tion of any other law of the Unites States... shall, upon the war-
rant of the Attorney General, be taken into custody and deported.
"95
The communist aliens argued that detention without a bail
hearing violated their Eighth Amendment right to be free from
excessive bail.9" The Court ruled that the language of the Eighth
Amendment fails to state that all arrests must be bailable; there-
fore it does not require that bail be allowed in all circumstances.97
The Court concluded that communists are a menace and danger to
the public interest and therefore the Attorney General was justi-
fied in detaining the communist aliens without a bail hearing,
pending the deportation determinations.9"
lated to (H) demand or receipt of ransom; (I) child pornography; (J) racketeering or gam-
bling offenses; (K) offenses concerned with the prostitution business, (L) gathering or
transmitting national defense information; (M) tax evasion offenses; (N) offenses related to
alien smuggling... (S) obstruction of justice offenses ... (U) attempt or conspiracy of any
offenses above listed. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A)-(U) (2000). Moral turpitude has been de-
fined as a "more than civic deficiency manifested by breaking known law. It is serious de-
linquency measured by general moral standards of time and country, of a sort or nature
that would be regarded as such, independently of there being any law against it." Skrmetta
v. Coykendall, 16 F. 2d 783, 784 (D.C. Ga. 1927).
93. Kim, 123 S. Ct. at 1725 (O'Connor, J., concurring). See Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S.
524 (1952).
94. Carlson, 324 U.S. at 526-27. Carlson was decided by a five to four decision, with
Justice Reed delivering the majority opinion and Justice Black authoring a dissenting
opinion, with whom Justices Frankfurter, Douglas and Burton joined. Id. at 526, 547.
95. Id. at 526 n.2 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 155 (1946)). The Communist aliens were charged
with violating the following provision: "[a]liens who believe in, advise, advocate, or teach, or
who are members of or affiliated with any organization ... that believes in, advises, advo-
cates, or teaches: (1) the overthrow by force or violence the Government of the United
States... "Id. at 527 n.3 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 137 (1946)).
96. Id. at 544-45. The Eighth Amendment provides: "[e]xcessive bail shall not be re-
quired, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S.
CONST. amend. VIII.
97. Carlson, 342 U.S. at 545.
98. Id. at 541-42. Carlson was decided by a 5 - 4 decision, with Justice Reed writing
for the majority and Justices Black, Burton, Douglas and Frankfurter each contributing to
a dissenting opinion. Id. at 526, 547. Carlson has not been overruled, but it did receive
negative treatment by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Hunt v. Roth, 648 F.2d 1148
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In 1987, The Supreme Court of the United States again consid-
ered the validity of pretrial detentions without bail.99 In United
States v. Salerno, the defendant was convicted of several RICO Act
violations and he was detained while awaiting trial without re-
ceiving a bail hearing.'00 Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the
opinion of the Court.'01 The Court was faced with determining the
validity of the Bail Reform Act of 1984, which allowed the pretrial
detention."2 The defendant argued that the Bail Reform Act vio-
lated both his due process rights under the Fifth Amendment and
the excessive bail provisions under the Eighth Amendment. 10 3 The
Court stated that in order to prove a statute or law unconstitu-
tional, the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances
exists under which the Act would be valid.
1 0 4
To determine if the Bail Reform Act is constitutional under the
Fifth Amendment, the Court examined Bell v. Wolfish. °5 Using
the standard set forth in Bell v. Wolfish, the Court inquired
whether the Bail Reform Act unjustifiably punished the defen-
dant, by detaining him without ruling on his guilt.' To answer
this question, Chief Justice Rehnquist considered the legislative
(8th Cir. 1981). In Hunt, an inmate was charged with sexual assault. Id. at 1151. The
Nebraska Constitution denies bail to anyone charged with sexual assault involving pene-
tration by force. Id. at 1154-55 (citing NEB. CONST. of 1875 art. I, § 9.). The Eighth Circuit
ruled that there was no distinction between excessive bail and denying bail altogether. Id.
at 1157.
99. U.S. v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987). The Salerno case does not involve aliens but
the pretrial detention, here involved, is the same in the regard that it is permitted on the
ground that the arrestee is likely to commit future crimes if released. Id. at 744. More-
over, the Court specifically makes reference to the detention of aliens in that "the Govern-
ment may detain individuals whom the Government believes to be dangerous." Id. at 748
(citing Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78, 84-85 (1909).
100. Id. at 743. RICO is an abbreviation for the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or-
ganizations Act. Id.
101. Id. at 741.
102. Id. "The Bail Reform Act of 1984 (Act) allows a federal court to detain an arrestee
pending trial if the Government demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence... that no
release conditions 'will reasonably assure ... the safety of any other person and the com-
munity." Id.
103. Id. at 746. "No person shall be... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of the law." U.S. CONST. amend. V. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor ex-
cessive fines imposed..." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
104. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745.
105. Id. at 746-47. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
106. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 746-47. 'Under the Due Process Clause, a detainee may not be
punished prior to an adjudication of guilt in accordance with due process of the law." Wolf-
ish, 441 U.S. at 535. "A person lawfully committed to pretrial detention has not been ad-
judged guilty of any crime." Id. He has had only a "judicial determination of the probable
cause as a prerequisite to [the] extended restraint of [his] liberty following arrest." Id.
(quoting Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975)).
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intent of the Bail Reform Act.'17 The Court concluded that the leg-
islative history of the Bail Reform Act indicated that Congress did
not intend the pretrial detention provisions as punishment for
dangerous individuals, but rather designed the provision to pre-
vent danger to the community.0 8 Therefore the Court determined
that the government's interest in protecting the community out-
weighed the defendant's individual interest of liberty.' 9 Through
this reasoning, the Court held that the Bail Reform Act was not
invalid under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.10
Chief Justice Rehnquist continued the analysis by addressing
whether the Bail Reform Act is constitutional under the Eighth
Amendment."' The Court began by stating that the Eighth
Amendment requires only that bail not be excessive; it does not
mandate that bail must be given in every circumstance." 2 "While
[the Court] agree[d] that a primary function of bail is to safeguard
the courts' role in adjudicating the guilt or innocence of defen-
dants, [the Court] reject[ed] the proposition that the Eighth
Amendment categorically prohibits the government from pursuing
other admittedly compelling interests through regulation of pre-
trial release.""' The Court finally concluded that the Bail Reform
Act survived the Eighth Amendment attack, as the Eighth
Amendment does not require release on bail."4
The majority of the Court also declined to overrule Carlson."'
The Court did not decide whether the Excessive Bail Clause, in
the Eighth Amendment, speaks to Congress's power to define the
classes of arrestees who shall be admitted to bail."16 In conclusion
Chief Justice Rehnquist stated "[i]n our society liberty is the
norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully
limited exception.""' 7 The Court held that "the provisions for pre-
107. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747 (citing Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 269 (1984)).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 748. The Court does not minimize the importance and fundamental nature of
the individual's strong interest in personal liberty. Id. at 750-51 (dictum).
110. Id. at 752.
111. Id.
112. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 753. "A court may, for example, refuse bail in capital cases."
Id. (dictum).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 754
115. Id. at 754-55. See Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952).
116. Salerno, U.S. at 754.
117. Id. at 755.
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trial detention in the Bail Reform Act of 1984 fell within that care-
fully limited exception."
11 8
Justice Marshall wrote a dissenting opinion." 9 The dissents ar-
gument followed the majority and began with an analysis of the
argument that the Bail Reform Act violates the Fifth Amend-
ment.120 The dissent was not satisfied with the majority's logic in
determining that the Bail Reform Act was enacted not to punish
but to protect the community."' Justice Marshall argued that
even if the Bail Reform act was not intended to punish, it never-
theless interfered with the invaluable guarantee afforded by the
presumption of innocence, as it allows for detention without a de-
termination of guilt.2 2 Quoting Chief Justice Vinson, Justice Mar-
shall argued that "[u]nless th[e] right to bail before trial is pre-
served, the presumption of innocence, secured only after centuries
of struggle, would lose its meaning."
23
Justice Marshall also disagreed with the majority's analysis of
whether the Bail Reform Act is unconstitutional with regard to
the Eighth Amendment's restriction on excessive bail. 24 The dis-
sent argued that the rationale of preventing excessive bail is that
if excessive bail is imposed, the defendant will remain in jail with-
out justification.125  Justice Marshall contended that when bail is
denied outright, the defendant would also stay in jail and thus the
rationale of excessive bail restrictions in the Eighth Amendment
also applies to an outright denial of bail.
126
In the recently decided case of Zadvydas v. Davis, the Supreme
Court of the United States was faced with the issue of whether the
Attorney General is allowed to detain aliens, who have already
118. Id. Salerno has also received negative treatment in Rhode Island Medical Society v.
Whitehouse, 66 F. Supp. 2d 288 (R.I. 1999). However, the Whitehouse case involved the
constitutionality of a Rhode Island partial birth abortion statue. Id. The negative treat-
ment specifically asks whether the Supreme Court's general rule that a court may only
invalidate a law on a facial challenge where "no set of circumstances exists under which
[the law] would be valid" applies to abortion issues. Id. at 312-13 (citing Salerno, 481 U.S.
at 754).
119. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 755 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens and Brennan
join in the dissent. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens also writes a dissenting
opinion, as well as joining in Justice Marshall's opinion. Id. at 767 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 758-59 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
121. Id. at 759 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 762-63 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
123. Id. at 766 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951)
(dictum)).
124. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 760 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 760-61 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
126. Id. at 761 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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been ordered to be deported, indefinitely or for only the reasonable
amount of time that is necessary to secure the removal.27 Nor-
mally, when an alien is ordered removed, the Attorney General
shall remove the alien within a period of 90 days.'28 The Court
noted, however, that in the case of criminal aliens, who have been
determined by the Attorney General to be a danger to society or
unlikely to comply with the order of removal, those aliens may be
detained beyond the 90 day removal period.'29
The Court noted that Zadvydas, the alien, had a lengthy crimi-
nal record, which included convictions for drug crimes, attempted
robbery, attempted burglary, and theft. 3 ° The Court also pointed
out that his recent convictions included possession with the intent
to distribute cocaine. 3' Two years after his release from prison,
Zadvydas was taken into INS custody, and in 1994, he was or-
dered deported.'32 However, after the deportation was ordered, the
INS was not able to place him in any other country.'33 Subse-
quently, he was detained beyond the normal removal period. 3 4 In
1995, Zadvydas filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under
28 U.S.C. § 2241131 to challenge his prolonged detention. The
Court granted certiorari in order to determine whether Zadvydas's
prolonged detention was constitutional.'
36
The Court's discussion continued by introducing the primary
argument presented by the INS.' The INS argued that 8 U.S.C. §
1231(a)(6) should be taken literally, in that it sets no specific limit
127. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 682 (2001). The Zadvydas case is actually a con-
solidation of two different factual situations that both raise the same issue, however; for
the purposes of simplicity, only the primary fact pattern will be discussed in this note. Id.
128. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A) (1994)).
129. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) (1994)).
130. Id. at 684.
131. Id. For his conviction, Zadvydas was sentenced to a term of 16 years of imprison-
ment. Id.
132. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 684.
133. Id. at 684-85. Zadvydas was born to Lithuanian parents in a German prison camp;
neither Lithuania nor Germany would accept him because he was not a citizen of either
country. Id. The INS also asked the Dominican Republic to accept him, as Zadvydas's wife
held citizenship there; however, this attempt failed as well. Id. at 684.
134. Id. at 685.
135. Id. at 684-85. "Writs of habeas corpus may be granted by the Supreme Court, any
justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit judge..." 8 U.S.C. § 2241(a) (2000).
136. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 686. The District Court ordered Zadvydas's release, as his
permanent detention was unconstitutional. Id. at 685 (citing Zadvydas v. Caplinger, 986 F.
Supp. 1011, 1027-28 (E.D. La. 1997)). The appellate court then reversed this decision,
holding that Zadvydas's detention was constitutional because the INS had taken "good
faith" efforts in attempting to secure his release. Id. (citing Zadvydas v. Underdown, 185
F.3d 279, 294, 297 (5th Cir. 1999)).
137. Id. at 689.
Winter 2004 369
370 Duquesne Law Review Vol. 42
on the length of time beyond the removal period that an alien may
be detained once that alien falls within the criminal category, thus
making him subject to a prolonged detention.13 s Therefore, the
INS contended that it is within the Attorney General's power to
detain a criminal alien for any length of time he deems neces-
sary. 139 The INS argued that this conclusion is justified by the in-
terest of protecting the community from aliens that have been de-
termined as a danger to society.14 ° The final point the INS brought
forth was that any interests in liberty the aliens possessed were
"greatly diminished" by their lack of a legal freedom to live in this
country.141
The Court looked at the language of the 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6)
and determined that there was no clear indication that Congress
intended to supply the Attorney General with the discretionary
power to indefinitely detain criminal aliens while they await re-
moval. 42 The Court, in conclusion, held that Zadvydas's release
was no longer reasonably foreseeable, and therefore the statute
did not authorize the continued detention, as the Attorney Gen-
eral did have the discretionary power to continue the detain-
ment.4 3  The Court's rule was summarized as "an alien may be
held in confinement until it has been determined that there is no
significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable fu-
ture.' 4
In Parra v. Perryman, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit ruled on an issue of alien detention. In
Parra, the defendant alien was convicted of aggravated sexual as-
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 690.
141. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 696.
142. Id. at 696-97. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) states, in pertinent part, that in the case of
criminal aliens, who have been determined by the Attorney General to be a danger to soci-
ety or unlikely to comply with the order of removal, those aliens may be detained beyond
the 90-day removal period. Id. at 683. (emphasis added). The Court specifically addressed
the use of the word may, but held that the word may does not necessarily suggest an unlim-
ited discretion. Id. at 697.
143. Id. at 701. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6). This holding is supported by the legal maxim
cessante ratione legis cessat ipse lex, which literally translates to "the rationale of a legal
rule no longer being applicable, that rule itself no longer applies." Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at
699.
144. Id. at 701. This case was decided by a 5 - 4 decision, with Justice Breyer writing
for the majority and Justice Kennedy writing a dissent, joined by the Chief Justice and
Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas in part; and Justice Scalia writing a dissent, joined by Jus-
tice Thomas. Id. at 682, 701, 705.
145. 172 F. 3d 957 (7th Cir. 1999).
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sault, which qualified as a felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c); he was
thus subjected to a mandatory detention pending his removal pro-
ceeding.'46 Three years after his conviction, an immigration judge
ruled that Parra was deportable and ineligible for any relief from
his removal. 147 The issue then focused on whether Parra would be
detained while awaiting his final removal.'48 The court held that
because Parra had conceded that he was deportable due to his
criminal convictions, he "forfeited any legal entitlement to remain
in the United States and [he had] little hope of clemency."'49 The
court concluded that once deportation proceedings have been initi-
ated, an alien's detention is constitutional.5 0
In Patel v. Zemski, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit ruled specifically on the constitutionality of the
mandatory detention presented in 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)."' Patel was
citizen of India, who moved to the United States in 1984 and be-
came a lawfully admitted permanent resident alien in 1990.152 In
2000, Patel pleaded guilty to a charge of employing and harboring
an undocumented alien.153 The INS then filed a Notice to Appear
for deportation proceedings by claiming that Patel's convictions
rose to the level of "aggravated felonies."'54 Patel was then sub-
jected to a mandatory detention, while he was to await deporta-
tion proceedings. 5 Patel challenged his detention by filing a peti-
tion for writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.'56 The district court de-
nied the petition and Patel subsequently appealed to the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit.1
57
146. Id. at 955. Parra was a citizen of Mexico. Id. His conviction occurred in 1996 after
he had pleaded guilty. Id. at 955, 956. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) a criminal alien who has
been convicted of a aggravated felony, defined under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43), shall be de-
tained by the Attorney General, pending a deportation proceeding. Id.
147. Id. at 956.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 957, 958.
150. Parra, 172 F. 3d at 958 (citing Arias v. Rogers, 676 F.2d 1139, 1143-44 (7th Cir.
1982)).
151. 275 F. 3d 299 (3d Cir 2001).
152. Id. at 303.
153. Id. Knowingly harboring an illegal alien is subject to criminal penalties. 8 U.S.C. §
1324(a)(1)(A)(iii) (2000).
154. Patel, 275 F. 3d at 303. "Aggravated Felony: Any alien who is convicted of an ag-
gravated felony at any time after admission is deportable." 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). An
offense relating to alien smuggling under 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (a) is an aggravated felony. 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(N).
155. Patel, 275 F. 3d at 303-04.
156. Id. at 304.
157. Id. See Patel v. Zemski, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6124 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
Winter 2004
Duquesne Law Review
In examining the constitutionality of Patel's detention, the court
relied upon Zadvydas by holding that a government detention for
non-punitive circumstances requires a special justification to out-
weigh an individual's interest in being free from restraint.' The
court applied this test by looking at the interests of the govern-
ment compared to Patel's interest of freedom from confinement.'59
The court noted that the government did not suggest that Patel
was either a danger to the community or a flight risk.6 ' The court
also looked at the nature of Patel's crimes, and stated that they
were not violent crimes, nor were they attendant with dangers.
6'
Finally, the court refused to follow the holding in Parra v.
Perryman as it assumed that all aliens subject to the mandatory
detention would be given a final order of deportation, where Patel
was still awaiting a final determination. 162  The court then re-
versed the district court's ruling and ordered Patel to be released
unless the government makes an immediate individualized de-
termination of whether Patel presents a flight risk or a danger to
the community.63
In a balancing test, where the interests of a criminal alien are
weighed against the interests of the nation as a whole, it seems, at
first glance, that the nation's interests would tip the scale dra-
matically in favor of the government. The Fifth Amendment's Due
Process Clause protects aliens of all categories."M As such, crimi-
nal aliens, who have served out their convictions, have a strong
interest in being free from physical confinement.' All citizens
also have an interest in being safe in their homes, business and
persons from threats of dangerous persons. But in the narrow
issue presented in Demore v. Kim, the criminal aliens who are de-
tained have not been deemed to be dangerous, as they are await-
ing that determination in their deportation proceeding. '66 An in-
158. Patel, 275 F. 3d at 309 (citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 689).
159. Id. at 310.
160. Id. at 312.
161. Id. at 313.
162. Id. at 313-14.
163. Patel, 275 F. 3d at 1315. The ruling in Patel was overruled by the holding in De-
more v. Kim, 123 S. Ct. 1708.
164. Demore v. Kim, 123 S. Ct. 1708, 1717.
165. Id. at 1734, 36 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 691-
92 (2000)).
166. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), which establishes that aliens who have been convicted of
"aggravated felonies" or "crimes of mural turpitude" shall be detained while they await a
deportation proceeding; where if the deportation proceeding determines the alien as a dan-
ger, that alien shall be deported. Id.
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terest in being safe from potentially dangerous individuals carries
much less weight than an interest in being safe from actually
dangerous individuals.
Everyday criminals are released into the public. Logic indicates
that they too are probably more likely then non-criminals to en-
gage in further criminal behavior; moreover, not every single
criminal who has been released will return for their parole hear-
ings. The mere possibility of future criminal activity does not jus-
tify continuing their confinement without possibility of bail. The
majority in Demore v. Kim pointed out that the rights and liberties
of aliens are subject to limitations and conditions not applicable to
citizens. '67 However, the Ninth Circuit Court's conclusion held
that lawfully admitted permanent resident aliens should be
treated at a higher standard then subordinate classes of aliens.6 '
Also there is a concern that "deportable criminal aliens, who are
not detained . . . would fail to appear for their proceedings."'69
This result would lead to a substantial inability to remove deport-
able aliens and impose monetary costs on the nation.7 ' But again,
the criminal aliens in this issue are only potentially deportable,
and thus the inability to remove deportable aliens would be de-
creased dramatically by the amount of aliens who would have
been ruled non-deportable.
The deportation proceeding is the judicial tool used to determine
whether a criminal alien is still a danger to society. Detaining an
alien prior to that proceeding presumes that the alien must be
dangerous; otherwise there would be no need to detain him. This
conclusion undermines the very purpose of the deportation pro-
ceeding. A detainment without possibility of bail is the functional
equivalent of a mandated determination of guilt without adjudica-
tion.
In the wake of Demore v. Kim, litigation is certain to arise in-
volving the detainment of aliens, which will further narrow the
already strained constitutional rights that apply to lawfully ad-
mitted permanent resident aliens. Also, given the present state of
foreign affairs, which involve an ever-increasing risk of terrorist
threats, there is arguably a societal trend tending to further re-
strict the rights of non-U.S. citizens. Although it is an undeniable
167. Kim, 123 S. Ct. at 1716 (citing Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 305-06 (1993)).
168. Kim v. Ziglar, 276 F. 3d 523, 539.
169. Kim, 123 S. Ct. at 1712.
170. Id. at 1715. The majority opinion in Demore v. Kim states that approximately 20%
of deportable aliens who were released failed to appear for their removal hearings. Id.
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goal of the government to protect citizens from threats and risks,
this goal cannot be accomplished by detaining criminal aliens
without just cause. It is not advocated that every criminal alien
should be granted an absolute right to bail. But for justice to be
served, each individual person that is protected by the United
States Constitution deserves the right to be heard in an individu-
alized determination rather then being deprived of well-
established legal principles.
Nathan Chase
